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Abstract—As autonomous robots become increasingly ubiq-
uitous, more attention is being paid to the security of robotic
operation. Autonomous robots can be seen as cyber-physical
systems that transverse the virtual realm and operate in the
human dimension. As a consequence, securing the operation
of autonomous robots goes beyond securing data, from sensor
input to mission instructions, towards securing the interaction
with their environment. There is a lack of research towards
methods that would allow a robot to ensure that both its
sensors and actuators are operating correctly without external
feedback. This paper introduces a robotic mission encoding
method that serves as an end-to-end validation framework for
autonomous robots. In particular, we put our framework into
practice with a proof of concept describing a novel map encoding
method that allows robots to navigate an objective environment
with almost-zero a priori knowledge of it, and to validate
operational instructions. We also demonstrate the applicability
of our framework through experiments with real robots for two
different map encoding methods. The encoded maps inherit all
the advantages of traditional landmark-based navigation, with
the addition of cryptographic hashes that enable end-to-end
information validation. This end-to-end validation can be applied
to virtually any aspect of robotic operation where there is a
predefined set of operations or instructions given to the robot.
Index Terms—Robotics; Autonomous Robots; Robotic Naviga-
tion; Cyber-Physical Security; Secure Navigation; Validation in
Robotics; Map Encoding;
I. INTRODUCTION
With robots and autonomous robots having an increasing
penetration across multiple aspects of our society, more atten-
tion is being paid to the safety and security aspects in robotic
operation [1]. The differentiation between safety and security
often becomes fuzzy, with the safety term being utilized to re-
fer to human-robot interaction [2], or to the safety of the robot
itself [3]. In either case, safe operation of an autonomous robot
requires tight control over the security of the data being used,
from data defining mission instructions to sensor data. Figure 1
shows a layered classification of stages in which information is
either collected or processed by an autonomous robotic system.
This figure extends the cyberattacks categorization in [4], and
also takes into consideration that the internal processes can be
modeled as a software-defined network from a more abstract
point of view [5]. Many robotic frameworks, such as the Robot
Operating System (ROS) fall into this consideration [6]. From
the cybersecurity domain point of view, the acquired sensor
data needs to be secured as well. This represents an additional
challenge. Therefore, an essential aspect in the operation of
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Fig. 1: Classification of data acquisition and analysis processes
in autonomous robots and matching security layers.
autonomous robots is to be able to validate both data being
shared among subsystems and external systems (a controller
or other robots), but also data defining or characterizing the
way the robot, seen as a cyber-physical system, interacts with
its environment.
A relevant precedent in securing multi-robot cooperation
was introduced by Castell Ferrer et al. in [7], where the
authors leveraged Merkle trees to cope with byzantine robots
in cooperative missions within swarms of robots. The main
novelty of their work is the introduction of a framework for
validating data in robots without relying on the data itself, by
encoding mission instructions in Merkle trees. Merkle trees are
cryptographic structures that enable validation of data through
cryptographic proofs that do not involve the data itself.
We aim at extending previous works into a more general
framework focusing on encoding not only of mission instruc-
tions but also on the relationship between the possible ways
in which a mission can be completed. In [7], one of the
main research questions is whether it is possible to provide
the “blueprint” of a robotic mission without describing the
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2mission itself. In this paper, we delve into the possibilities
and limitations of encoding instructions, exploring different
application scenarios and developing more specific ways in
which this idea can be integrated into real robotic missions.
Here, we go beyond separating data verification from the
data itself, towards defining new implicit ways for defining
complex robotic workflows. We first describe the framework
and the different possibilities, from human-robot interaction to
collaborative robots, and then provide a proof of concept with
navigation instructions. This proof of concept demonstrates
that traditional robot behavior can be maintained with minimal
impact on robustness and applicability even when providing
full mission codification, opening the door to more secure and
safe deployment of autonomous robots.
Summarizing the previous considerations, we have found an
unexplored research gap in robust data validation schemes for
autonomous or semi-autonomous robots. The main research
questions that we find so far unanswered extend the work in [7]
towards broader data validation in autonomous robots:
• Is it possible for a robot to safely and securely interact
with its environment, operators or other robots in a way
that it has zero a priori knowledge of the mission itself;
• can encoded information revealing no explicit mission
instructions maintain the level of efficiency and applica-
bility of current robotic workflows; and, finally,
• can these encoded mission instructions be utilized to si-
multaneously validate their integrity but also the progress
of the mission, together with local information such as
sensor inputs and operation of actuators.
The first of the above questions applies to a wide variety
of situations. For instance, whether a robot in a factory can
be given assembly instructions that it cannot understand until
the assembly process starts, or whether a robot can be given a
map that it can only understand when it starts to navigate its
environment. An even more interesting situation occurs when
a robot can interact with a human or another robot in a prede-
fined way only when a series of conditions are met. The latter
two questions extend the same concept towards more concrete
aspects: whether these encoded instructions can be adapted to
current robotic algorithms and workflows, extending previous
works relying on random movement, and, finally, whether
instructions understood by the robots can, simultaneously,
validate that all processes are working properly. Thus, we are
asking whether a single framework can define both end-to-end
data validation and define encoded instructions that enable a
robot to securely and safely interact with its environment.
These considerations cover the validation of a robot’s op-
eration from end to end: from validating sensor data and the
correct operation of actuators to validating mission instructions
and information received from an external controller. In our
experiments, we consider a navigation or exploration mission
where a priori information (features) about the environment is
available to the mission controller or robot operator (operator
hereinafter). In this scheme, an operator generates a set of
encoded instructions by hashing the description of a set of
landmarks (waypoints) in the environment. The set of encoded
landmarks is then given for autonomous robots which utilize
them to navigate the objective environment with zero a priori
knowledge of it. The encoded landmarks are given to the
robots in the form of a navigation graph which also includes
information about how to navigate between consecutive land-
marks. Because all information is encoded, we minimize the
amount of raw data a priori exposed at the robots.
The main contributions of this work are
1) the definition of an end-to-end validation framework for
autonomous robots based on encoded instruction graphs;
2) the introduction of a novel approach that encodes a nav-
igation graph utilizing cryptographic hashes to encode
environment features, and
3) the definition of a set of methods that allow robots
to follow encoded mission instructions while validating
their sensor data without external feedback.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we overview previous works that address security
issues in robotic systems. Section III then introduces the
proposed framework, and describes different use cases.From
Section IV onward, we delve into a proof of concept for
robotic navigation. In that direction, Section IV introduces
the implementation details for an encoded navigation graph,
with Section V presenting the methodology we have followed
in our simulations and experiments. Section VI describes the
experimental results. Finally, Section VII concludes the work
and outlines future research directions.
II. BACKGROUND
There has been a growing interest in securing robotic
systems, partly owing to the increased connectivity with which
robots are equipped. This is partly due to an increasing
amount of data exchange modalities with new attack vectors
in remote control commands [8], telemetry [9], offloading
computation [10], [11], robot-to-robot communication [7],
[12], and human-robot interaction [13].
Multiple research efforts have been devoted to studying
cybersecurity issues in robotics. In [4], Clark et al. review
and discuss the main security threads to robotic systems, from
spoofing sensor data to denial of service attacks, and including
other typical vector attacks such as malicious code injection
or signal interference. However, this analysis only takes into
account the security aspect in robotics from the cybernetic
point of view, without considering the physical dimensions
in which robots operate. The interaction of a robot with its
environment presents key issues that cannot be addressed with
traditional risk mitigation techniques from the cybersecurity
domain. An early work in this direction was presented by Py
et al. in 2004 [14], where the authors introduced an execution
control framework for autonomous robots that would analyze
the data obtained from the behavior of the robot through
a state checker. A more recent work taking into account
the nature of robotic operations was presented by Tang et
al. [15], where sensor data was estimated through a denial
of service attack. Similarly, in [16], Tiku et al. introduced
a methodology for overcoming security vulnerabilities in a
deep learning localization method by introducing adversarial
training samples. All these approaches, however, take the point
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Fig. 2: Sample encoded instruction graph, with hashes being defined from different environmental information, or combinations
of sensor data, localization data, and one or more of the available actions. The mission can be completed successfully only if
the hashes are decoded sequentially. Note that there is not necessarily a single way of progressing in the mission.
of view of data security in information systems and do not
explicitly involve the cyber-physical nature of autonomous
robots and their interaction with the environment, which is
the objective of this paper. In terms of distributed and multi-
robot systems, most efforts have been directed towards the
analysis and mitigation of security issues from a networking
perspective [17].
From the point of view of data validation, Legashev et al.
described an approach for monitoring, certification, and valida-
tion of the operation of autonomous robots [18]. The authors’
aim was to define a generic framework from a legislative
approach, relying on periodic telemetry data obtained from
autonomous robots and, in particular, autonomous vehicles.
The framework focuses on validating the robot’s operation
but not the data itself. The only method available to validate
the data itself in this work is through statistical analysis and
detection of statistical abnormalities. Data integrity was also
the objective of Yousef’s et al study on cyber-physical threats
on robotic platforms [19].
In general, we see a research gap in terms of addressing
the physical dimension in robotic operation from a security
and safety point of view. This becomes even more evident
when analyzing the most widely used robotic frameworks.
Among them, the Robot Operating System (ROS) has become
a standard across both industry and academia. Multiple re-
searchers have studied the security flaws of ROS [20], and
proposed different approaches to address these issues [21].
Moreover, many of these are being mitigated in the newest
version, ROS2 [22]. However, these efforts are again directed
at securing ROS as a distributed and networked system, and
not from the point of view of a robotic framework meant for
robots to interact with their environment. While it is highly
important to provide security from the data flow point of view,
we direct our efforts in this paper towards the gap in securing
and validating the way robots are controlled and interact with
their environment.
In this work, we focus on providing a framework for
validating data integrity. Other types of cyberattacks such as
denial of service attacks, in which the communication channels
are congested, are not considered. Nonetheless, it is worth
noting that our proposed approach can provide some benefits
even in such situations. While the communication channel
utilized to transmit the encoded commands to the robot might
be known to an attacker, the sensor data or inputs triggering
the different actions are unknown even to the robot itself,
if multiple possibilities exist. Therefore, our framework also
provides partial mitigation for other types of cyberattacks
where the channel utilized to trigger a robot’s actions might
be disguised within the encoded instruction graph sent to the
robot before the mission starts.
III. ENCODED INSTRUCTION GRAPHS
In this section, we describe the main framework components
and how it can be applied in different scenarios.
A. Encoding Robotic Instructions
We follow up on the instruction encryption ideas from [7],
where missions instructions are given to a robot by encoding
combinations of sensor inputs and a set of robot actions.
We do not consider explicitly multi-robot cooperation but
instead focus on describing robust options for encrypting and
decrypting mission instructions. Moreover, we also evaluate
the performance degradation inherent to encrypting data when
compared to standard robotic operation, avoiding random
behaviour. In order to do that, the first step is to not only
encode a set of actions and features from sensor data, but also
some other variable that enables a hash search, a trial-and-
error process in which a robot does not need to be able to
reproduce a specific hash but instead can try multiple hashes
until finding a match. An example of this is the addition of
a spatial or temporal component. The second step is then to
define not only a series of encoded actions but also encoded
states, which can be defined based on a combination of
variables (e.g., position, time, sensor data or other external
inputs). By encoding both states and actions, we can then wrap
the set of encoded information into a graph structure, such that
the encoded information in an edge of the graph gives the robot
information about how to arrive to a different state or process.
We call this an encoded instructions graph. A sample encoded
instructions graph is shown in Fig. 2. In this graph, the initial
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Fig. 3: Different validation modalities and data flows. The same approach can be utilized for individual mission instructions,
event-based commands, chained instructions, or multi-robot communication.
instruction is encoded into a hash H1, which the robot is able
to decode by combining a certain predefined action with some
sensor data. Most of the nodes in the graph represent states,
with the majority of the nodes in this example being defined
by a position and some sensor data. However, the information
that nodes encode is not restrictive, as it can be both actions
or states. The edges, however, should encode information that
enable the robot to transit between nodes, and therefore should
include some type of action or external input. An edge can
also be empty, i.e., if the robot can gather enough information
to decode a different node without any intermediate step. In
the example in Fig. 2, the initial node triggers an action by
the robot whenever it is able to acquire some certain sensor
data. It can then proceed to two different states in which
it must to be able to reproduce both its position and sense
a different variable. The encoded information in the second
node, H2, can then be decoded after a certain time, which can
for example be used as a failsafe to go back to the initial state
if the sensor data defining H3 cannot be acquired in time.
In practice, the robot is not aware of the type of information
encoded in each hash, and must therefore perform a continuous
trial and error process to try to reproduce the hashes by all
the different means it has been preprogrammed for. In our
experiments, we show that this process of trial-and-error has a
mostly negligible impact compared to the computational cost
of extracting features or processing sensor data in standard
robotics algorithms. In any case, the process of deciding how
to define the encoded instructions is not trivial, as they must be
reproducible, while concise enough to avoid data mismatches.
An encoded instruction graph as described above is a
directed graph. For a mission that has only one possible
solution and where each step is followed by one and only one
other step, then the graph is reduced to a path or linear graph.
In many cases, the graph will be acyclic. This happens when
there are multiple options to complete a mission, but once a set
of steps is taken then the same ones cannot be taken again. For
instance, in a manufacturing process, the order in which a set
of parts are moved to a working bench might not matter, yet
every part must be moved exactly once. In a general case, the
graph can be arbitrarily complex and contain any number of
cycles. For instance, a reconnaissance mission in which a robot
has to navigate an objective area without any specific order
could have multiple cycles. Higher mission control embedded
at the robot should then be able to understand these more
complex graphs and provide a planning strategy that is not
directly sent by the mission controller. An example of this
will be given in our experiments.
B. Validation Modalities
The proposed approach can be extended to multiple sce-
narios, as the encoded information cannot only be a set of
predefined actions and features extracted from sensor data,
but also other external inputs, variables defining the state
of the robot, or even timing constraints. The possibility of
utilizing external inputs is particularly interesting as it enables
secure and secret multi-robot cooperation but also new ways
of defining under which conditions human-robot interaction
can happen. Since the inputs can already be encoded, the
information exchanged between robots or utilized as external
signals triggering robot actions can be defined in a way that
they are totally meaningless and only usable when combined
with other data. Therefore, if the data is spoofed or a third
party gains access to this communication medium, no real data
is actually compromised. Different possibilities for encoding
and decoding instructions are shown in Fig. 3, and described
in more detail in the following subsections.
1) Independent Validation: The simplest approach is to
encode mission instructions individually and independently. In
this case, an encoded instruction set can be sent to the robot,
similar to the approach followed in [7] but where only the
leaves of the Merkle tree would be sent. This set of instructions
does not define a graph structure and does not represent the
main interest of this paper. However, these instructions can be
utilized as the root of an encoded instruction graph, or as a
trigger for starting a parallel process at the robot.
An additional layer of security can be added by introducing
time or spatial constraints. Time constraints (e.g., introducing
a timestamp in the hash) provide an extra layer of security
against attacks that could spoof the encoded data and re-
produce it later, even if the data itself cannot be decoded.
Similarly, spatial constraints can be added by including the
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robot’s location in the hash. This, however, only prevents the
replication of the robot’s behavior in other locations.
2) Iterative Validation: An iterative validation happens
when a robot is able to validate its own actions. This particular
modality will be the case studied in the next sections with the
introduction of an encoded navigation graph.
Encoded instruction graphs defining an iterative validation
process can contain different types of encoded data in their
nodes and edges. For instance, sensor data can be encoded
in the graph nodes, which serve the purpose of validating the
process. Additionally, this sensor data can encode other in-
formation, such as positional information or time information
that can be utilized as a part of the control loops at the robot.
Then, the actual instruction for the robot to move towards the
next step is encoded in the edge of the graph, which encodes
both the data in the current node being validated and the action
or actions that will enable the robot to decode the next node.
An illustration of this process is shown in Fig. 4.
3) Multi-Robot Simultaneous and Mutual Validation: As
we have mentioned earlier, one significant scenario where this
validation framework can be applied is in multi-robot cooper-
ative behavior. Complementing the ideas proposed in [7], we
are now also able to break down a mission in two disjoint
parts that can be given to two different robots. An example
of this is shown in Fig. 5, which illustrates a collaborative
inspection process. Each encoded instruction is defined with
the combination of different signals or parameters, or a subset
Collaborative Inspection – Encoded Instructions
I1 = M1 M2 S1 S2 C1
2 C2
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2 S2
1 F
Mi Encoded instruction to robot i: encoded action + triggering data (Si / Si
j / Cji/ F).
Si Sensor data triggering instruction Mi, describing the operational environment.
Si
j Sensor data at robot i, describing robot j’s actions.
Ci
j Encoded message that robot i sends to j to trigger action Mj.
F Indicates whether the action is triggered directly at either robot (first action).
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Fig. 5: Illustration of a collaborative inspection process where
robots only have partial instructions.
of them. First, data triggering an action can be a set of features
extracted by the robot from its own sensor data, but we can
now also differentiate between sensing the environment and
sensing the behavior of the other robot. Second, the two or
more robots can also exchange messages in order to trigger
each other’s actions. These messages can be meaningless to
both of them, and also include environment data for an extra
layer of robustness.
IV. ENCODED NAVIGATION GRAPH
One of the most fundamental ways in which a robot interacts
with its environment is by navigating it. Maps have long been
utilized for autonomous navigation and exploration in mobile
robots to increase the robustness of long-term autonomous
operation [23]–[25]. Maps or landmarks provide robots means
for localization in a known reference frame, while enabling
the calibration and adjustment of on-board odometry and
localization algorithms.
Landmark-based navigation has been successfully imple-
mented in various mobile robots with quick response (QR)
codes [26]–[28] or other identifiable images [29]–[31], wire-
less sensor networks [32], or ultra-wideband (UWB) mark-
ers [33]–[35], among others including IMU fusion [28], or
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Fig. 6: Encoded navigation graph construction process: (a) shows a sample floorplan and (b) the corresponding navigation
graph. Subfigures (c) and (d) contain the information given to robots, a list of hashes and an adjacency matrix with the edge
hashes to aid navigation between landmarks, respectively. The landmark hashes are calculated based on the position (x, y, z)
and the landmark type (LT ): Hi = H(LTi + xi + yi + zi), where H is the hashing function and + means concatenation. The
edge hashes are Hi∠i,j = H(LTi + xi + yi + zi + ∠i, j), where ∠i, j represents the navigation direction from i to j.
topological maps in for infrastructure-free navigation [36].
When utilizing landmarks that are already encoding certain
information, such as QR codes or other text representations,
is that additional information can be embedded into the
landmarks. In an industrial scenario, this can be utilized to
provide further instructions for robots [37].
In order to analyze the viability of this idea and discuss the
potential directions for solving the research questions defined
in Section I, we consider the most essential aspect of a robot’s
interaction with its environment: the navigation. Therefore, we
capsulize the research questions to more concrete considera-
tions regarding the navigation of autonomous robots:
1) Is it possible to provide a description of the environment
(e.g., a map or a set of landmarks and how to travel
between them) to an autonomous robot, in a way that
the robot is unable to understand the map until it
starts navigating, and such that it can only decode the
information in that map if a series of conditions on how
it sees its environment are met?
2) Is there a way of defining navigation instructions for
an autonomous robot such that any modification of
those instructions automatically renders them unusable
ensuring that if wrong sensor data is fed to the robot’s
controller, the instructions cannot be followed?
A. Encoded Graph Definition
Rather than modeling a map of the objective exploration
area and utilize it for navigation, we utilize a landmark-based
navigation graph that encodes the position of the different
landmarks and the navigable directions between landmarks.
In this graph, each vertex represents one encoded position in
the map, and each edge represents a straight or unique path
between two positions. By unique we mean a path that might
not be straight but such that the robot can realistically follow.
A sample map and the corresponding encoded navigation
graph are illustrated in Figure 6. In this and latter sections,
we utilize the following notation. A graph is an ordered pair
G = (V,E), where V represents a set of vertices, and E
represents a set of edges associated with two distinct vertices,
i.e., a set of tuples {(Vi, Vj) | Vi, Vj ∈ V }. We consider a
directed graph, were the order of these tuples matters.
The most straightforward approach to landmark encoding is
to define the hash of a position given its coordinates ~r ∈ R3.
Thus we would define Hi = H(~ri). In order to ensure that
hashes will be reproducible, the coordinates need to be given
in a coarse grid with a resolution that is dependent on the
accuracy of the robots’ onboard odometry.
If the environment is accessible a priori, elements can be
installed that facilitate the localization of robots when they
are nearby, such as QR codes, or Bluetooth/UWB beacons.
The QR codes contain hashed data and can encode additional
information, for example, instructions for a robot to operate
in a given room or area. An alternative approach is to utilize
the environment geometry and topology. The coordinates of
the features can still be utilized to define their hash without
using a predefined grid. Rather than having a robot utilizing
its own or near position to calculate the hash, it can calculate
it based on the coordinates of a position that depends on the
robot’s current local environment.
7B. Deployment and Navigation
We assume that the position where a robot is deployed is
either known in an absolute reference frame, or utilized as a
common reference in the robots’ local coordinate system. If
only local references are utilized, these must have a common
orientation. The initial position is encoded with a hash but also
known to robots.
In the encoded navigation graph, each edge in the graph
is given two hashes, as the robots might reach these from
different directions. Therefore, the adjacency matrix contain-
ing the edge hashes shown in Fig. 6 is not symmetric. Only
minimal information about the local environment required
for navigation purposes needs to be stored at the robots.
Odometry-only (map-free) navigation, when possible, would
be preferred to minimize the amount of raw information that
robots store.
The directions between features, or the initial position and
near features, is encoded in a way that can be matched by
robots on a basis of trying multiple possible directions until
finding one that produces the corresponding hash. The edge
hashes are calculated on a trial-and-error basis, and thus they
can be defined with an arbitrary division of the [0, 2pi) interval.
However, this decision must take into account the trade-off
with the inherent computational overhead. Furthermore, not all
the navigable directions are necessarily selected, and therefore
the real topology of the objective environment can be, to some
extent, hidden. In addition, multiple features can be selected
within a single room or small area, but even if all detectable
at the same time, a fully connected subgraph does not need
to be generated within the navigation graph. In general terms,
there is a trade-off between the number of actual connections
between features that are encoded in the navigation graph,
and the robustness of the navigation in the event of robots not
being able to reproduce a certain subset of landmark hashes.
C. Landmark-based Localization
The accuracy of the feature’s position directly affects the
error tolerance for the odometry method utilized for navigation
when no landmarks are detected. In order to cope with the
odometry error, if it can be estimated then it can be taken into
account to calculate the hashes from the position of landmarks,
following a trial-and-error approach within a certain spatial
area around the landmark. The number of trials that a robot
needs to perform depends on the accuracy of the odometry
method utilized, and the granularity of the grid utilized to
define the position of the landmarks and calculate the hashes.
Additionally, the possibility of the robot identifying a wrong
landmark that is nearby must be taken into account. Therefore,
there is a trade-off between accuracy and robustness with
multiple factors to take into consideration.
V. METHODOLOGY
In order to test the feasibility of the encoded navigation
approach presented in this paper, we have run a series of
simulations and experiments. In these, we analyze the over-
head and performance impact from calculating hashes and
utilizing the encoded navigation graph. In all cases, we make
the assumption that the environment is known to the mission
controller. We have devised two types of application scenarios
in which we test the proposed framework.
First, we consider an environment where only robots oper-
ate. In this case, we have simulated the interior of a building
with empty rooms. For this scenario, we utilize a simulation
environment, in which we encode geometric features in the
navigation graph: doorways, corners and rooms. For the sim-
ulations, we consider a fully automated environment with no
dynamic obstacles and known geometry. This can be applied,
for instance, to logistic warehouses where only autonomous
robots operate. It can also be applied to autonomous cleaning
machines operating at night, or, in general, any scenario where
the environment does not change significantly over time. In
our simulations, the robot relies on a two-dimensional laser
scanner for feature detection.
Second, we consider a real office setting with a dynamically
changing environment, people moving in it and a wide variety
of objects populating the different rooms. The experiments
are carried out relying on visual markers that can be placed
in multiple fixed locations. For this application scenario, real
experiments are carried out in an office environment with
people and a variety of furniture across different rooms.
Because of the large amount of desks, chairs and other
equipment, detecting geometric features from the environment
would render irreproducible hashes and multiple situations in
which features can not be detected due to either objects or
people blocking the field of view of sensors. To tackle this
issue, we have utilized QR codes as markers to encode the
landmark positional information.
A. Simulation Environment
The proposed encoding approach has been implemented
within the Robot Operating System (ROS) in Python. ROS
is the current de-facto standard for production-ready robot
development [38], [39]. The simulations were carried out
within the ROS/Stage environment. A TurtleBot 3 is simulated
with a 2D lidar and wheel odometry. The robot is set to explore
an indoor environment with a floorplan illustrated in Fig. 9 (a).
The environment is 40 × 40m2, and the robot has a circular
shape with a diameter of 0.35m. The simulated environment
contains 9 rooms with a single entrance and 6 more spaces
and corridors in between. The starting exploration position of
the robots is near the main door, in the bottom-left. The 2D
lidar has a field of view of 270° and produces 1080 samples
(0.25° resolution) in each scan, with a scan rate of 1 Hz.
This work presents a proof of concept, and therefore we do
not study the effect that different odometry methods have in
the exploratory mission. Instead, we utilize wheel odometry
and vary its error to study the impact that the corresponding
computational overhead has due to a larger number of hashes
being calculated.
Feature Extraction
In the simulation experiments, we utilize three types of
features to localize the robot and navigate the environment:
doorways, concave corners and rooms. These are defined from
8Algorithm 1: Feature Extraction and Hash Calculation
1 Callback:
2 Calculate:
3 F = getF (data); // Orientation-ordered F set
4 Fcv = getCv(F) ⊆ F; // Set of concave features
5 Fcc = getCx(F) ⊆ F; // Set of convex features
6 Define:
7 H = []; // List of hashes
8 foreach fpi, fpj ∈ Fcv do
9 if ‖fpi − fpj‖ < δdw then
10 H.append(doorwayHash(fpi, fpj));
11 foreach fpi ∈ F do
12 if fpi+j ∈ Fcx ∀j ∈ {−1, 0, 1} then
13 H.append(roomHash(fpi-1, fpi, fpi+1));
14 foreach fpi ∈ Fcv do
15 if isCorner(fpi) && notDoor(fpi) then
16 H.append(cornerHash(fpi));
17 // Utilize any matching hashes to update the robot’s
18 // position with respect to the global reference frame
19 if ∃ h ∈ H | h ∈ NavGraph then
20 updateAbsolutePosition(H)); // Use matching
hashes
the same set of F feature points which we denote as Features
of Interest FoI = {fp1, . . . , p = fpF }, where fpi ∈ R3.
The feature extraction process is outlined in Algorithm 1. The
NavGraph variable stores a list of hashed positions as well as
an adjacency matrix with the edge hashes. A sample of this is
shown in Fig. 6, subfigures (c) and (d). The function search()
calculates a certain number of hashes over a predefined area
around the identified feature until it either finds a matching
hash from NavGraph or ends the search unsuccessfully. This
function ensures that the hashes are reproducible even if odom-
etry error accumulates over the inter-landmark navigation. The
search area is defined based on the expected odometry error as
well as the granularity of the grid utilized to define the hashes.
Finally, the function updateAbsolutePosition() takes the
matching hashes as arguments, calculates the relative position
of the robot with respect to the landmarks that have been
identified and utilizes the known position of the landmarks
(which is encoded in the hashes) to recalculate its own position
and restart the odometry estimation.
Doorways: We define doorways as any set of two con-
cave feature points that are within two predefined dis-
tances (δdw,min, δdw,max) from each other. In our simula-
tions and experiments, we set these distances to δdw,min =
1.2m, δdw,max = 2.5m. Note that these feature points might
not be consecutive if we consider the ordered set of feature
points by orientation. We define the corresponding waypoint
to be encoded according to (1):
Hdw(fpi, fpj) = H
(
”doorway”,
fpi + fpj
2
,∠fpifpj
)
(1)
DashGo Wheel 
Odometry
IMU
Camera
3D Lidar
Odom
Lidar Odom
QR Code 
Decoding
3D Map
Odom Error
Hash-based 
Localization
Loc. Error
Ground Truth
Fig. 7: Data flow in the experiments. Each box represents a
ROS Node which has been implemented either in C++ or
Python. The outputs are the ground truth, odometry (odom)
error and has-based localization error (loc. error).
Corners: For each concave corner not in a doorway, we
define its corresponding hash with (2):
Hcv(fpi) = H (”corner”, fpi,∠fpi) (2)
where ∠ represents the orientation of the normal vector to the
wall surface at the position of the corner.
Rooms: A room waypoint is defined as the centroid of any
three consecutive convex points, calculated as the arithmetic
mean of their positions. To reduce the probability of having a
mismatch in rectangular rooms where two consecutive subsets
of three convex corners are visible by a robot, we add the area
∆ of the triangle that the points define:
Hdw(fpi, fpi+1, fpi+2) =
H
(
”room”,
fpi + fpi+1 + fpi+2
3
,∆i,i+1,i+2
)
(3)
B. Real-Robot Experimental Settings
The experimental environment is shown in Fig. 11 (a). For
the experiments, an EAIBOT DashGo D1 has been utilized.
We have installed a 16-Channel Leishen 3D Lidar, an SC-
AHRS-100D2 IMU, and a Logitech c270 USB camera. The
DashGo provides wheel odometry from its differential drive
system. The 3D lidar is utilized to accurately localize the
landmarks and provide ground truth odometry. The camera
is utilized to detect the QR codes and extract the encoded in-
formation in them. Figure 7 show the implementation diagram
with different ROS nodes. The 3D lidar odometry and mapping
are adapted from the LeGo-LOAM-BOR package [40]. The
QR code decoding node has been written in Python using
OpenCV and the Zbar library. The hash based localization
node utilizes the QR codes for localization when available
and the wheel and inertial odometry as an estimation between
landmarks. The QR codes utilized during the experiment are
of known size (12 cm by 12 cm), and the localization node
has been calibrated to map the size in pixels of a detected QR
code in the camera to the distance to it. The localization also
takes into account the relative orientation of the QR code.
9Fig. 8: Floorplan of the simulation environment. All doors,
rooms and corners are utilized as encoded landmarks.
C. Feature Hashing
We utilize SHA3-256 for hashing [41], which generates
32 byte hashes. It takes an average of under 500 ns on an
Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-6200U CPU with the pysha3 imple-
mentation in Python. If additional security is required against
offline attacks on exposed hashes, other hashing algorithms
such as Bcrypt [42] can be utilized. Bcrypt needs around
300 ms to generate a hash with the same CPU. However,
there is a trade-off between security and real-time operation
as robots need to calculate multiple hashes per lidar scan. We
believe that, in most applications, SHA3-256 is enough and
can be utilized even in resource-constrained devices.
VI. SIMULATION AND EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We have carried out a series of simulations with one and
multiple robots to evaluate mainly the cost of utilizing hash
matching for localization and navigation, but also the impact
on accuracy of the encoded landmarks.
A. Metrics
In order to evaluate the simulation results, we measure the
absolute localization error of the robot with odometry only
and hash matching. Furthermore, we analyze the distribution
of the computational load among the different tasks that the
robots are carrying out: feature extraction, hash calculation
and hash matching. In the simulations, we also measure the
effect of the odometry-based localization noise and the choice
of spatial granularity for landmark positions.
B. Simulation Results
The aim of the simulations is to prove whether our encoded
landmark localization and navigation scheme is viable and
adds a significant computational overhead or not.
Figure 9 (b) shows the path recovered from odometry mea-
surements and hash-based localization with doorway hashes
only, and all three types of hashes, together with the ground
truth (GT). The data is recorded over 150 s; the translation
odometry noise is set with σt = 0.03, and rotation noise
with σr = 0.05. The absolute error of each of these paths
is given in Fig. 9 (c). Because the doorway-type landmarks
are predominant in the chosen simulation environment, the
localization error does not decrease significantly when also
considering rooms and concave corners.
In the simulated environment, we have predefined the po-
sition of landmarks with an accuracy of 0.1 m. Therefore,
when analyzing the errors in Fig. 9 (c) and Fig. 9 (d), any
values below 0.15 m represent virtually zero error. Fig. 9 (d)
shows that the localization method is robust even when the
odometry error increases significantly (σt = 0.05). However,
there is a limit, around σt = 0.06, for which the size of the
environment is big enough that the robot is unable to match
landmark hashes due to odometry error. In order to calculate
these hashes, we assume an error tolerance with respect to its
estimated position of ±0.5 m, independently of the size of the
grid utilized to locate the landmarks and generate the hashes.
Regarding the computational overhead necessary to calcu-
late the hashes, estimate the robot’s position, and perform
path planning accordingly, Fig. 9 (e) shows the distribution
of computational time utilized to extract the set of features, or
points of interest, from the raw lidar data and the distribution
of computational time utilized in calculating and matching
hashes. For an error tolerance of ±0.5 m, the graphic shows
situations in which the robot tests up to 9, 25, 121, 441 and
1681 grid positions, respectively. The search for a hash match
is gradually done in a spiral manner around the estimated
position and within the aforementioned error tolerance. These
results show that even with fine-grained grid search, in average
the time required to localize the robot based on hashes is
two orders of magnitude smaller than the time required to
extract features from lidar data. In the worst-case scenario,
the time required can be comparable, with an equivalent order
of magnitude for both hash matching and feature extraction.
C. Experiment Results
Figure 11 (b) shows the path recovered from odometry
measurements and hash-based localization (QR codes). The
error in the odometry is significantly higher than in the
simulation experiments due to a drift in the yaw measurements.
However, the translational odometry error is much smaller.
The hash-based localization is able to correct this orientation
whenever a QR code is within the field of view, and therefore
it does not suffer from the yaw drift. The maximum hash-
based localization error that we observed was of 41.3 cm. This
allowed the utilization of a fine grid of 2 cm for calculating
the landmark hashes. We set a 1m2 hash search area around
the estimated location which was enough in this case.
A total of 23 QR codes were installed in the office environ-
ment, and the tests were done with a small number of persons
in their offices. Out of those, 17 QR codes were utilized by
the robot during its navigation. The execution time of the
hash matching algorithm was on average over one order of
magnitude smaller than the time required to extract the QR
codes from camera images. Thus, the overhead was mostly
negligible. Only in a reduced number of occasions was the
latency of these two processes comparable, as Fig. 11 (e)
shows.
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(c) Odometry and hash-based localization error for different odometry
noise levels.
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(d) Execution time of the different processes (feature extraction in
red, hash search and matching in blue) for a varying grid size.
Fig. 9: Simulation results. Subfigures (a) and (b) show the reconstructed path and errors, respectively, with ground truth (GT)
wheel and inertial odometry (O), only doorway hashes (D), and all features: doors(D), rooms (R) and concave corners (CC).
Subfigure (c) shows the odometry and hash-based localization errors for different odometry noise levels. Finally, (d) shows the
execution time distribution for the feature extraction (red) and hash matching (blue) processes, where the grid size represents
the search space when trying to find a hash match.
Fig. 10: 3D point cloud of the experiment environment utilized
as ground truth in our experiments. The path of the robot is
shown with colored points, where red represents the start of
the mission and purple the end.
D. Viability and Usability
We have seen that the computational overhead added when
encoding landmarks is mostly negligible. Thus, our approach
could be incorporated on top of many existing navigation and
localization schemes, whether they are landmark-based or not,
to increase the level of security if the error tolerance allows.
This approach has additional uses when more than one robot
is taken into consideration. In multi-robot cooperation, differ-
ent robots can share their plans, progress or position (based on
the navigation graph only) with others by utilizing the same
hashes or parts of them. This would reduce the possibility of
raw data being exposed but also virtually eliminate the options
for attackers or byzantine agents to affect the mission, as has
been shown in [7].
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Security and safety in robotics are crucial aspects to take
into account with the current surge of autonomous robots
penetrating multiple aspects of our society and the increasing
interaction between robots, and between robots and humans. In
this direction, further research needs to focus on the validation
of data at the different layers of robotic systems, and in
particular the validation of the interaction of a robot with
its environment. This interaction often starts with navigation,
which has been the main aspect studied in this paper.
Navigation and localization in autonomous robots require
large amounts of raw data for long-term operation, either
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Fig. 11: Experiment results. Subfigures (a) and (b) show the reconstructed path and errors, respectively, with ground truth (GT),
wheel and inertial odometry (Odom) and hash-based localization (Hash). In (c), we show a scatter plot with the localization
error every time that a QR code is within the field of view of the camera. Finally, (d) shows the execution time for the QR code
extraction when it is within field of view (QRV), for the QR code extraction process globally and independently on whether
there is or not a QR code visible (QRG), for the hash matching algorithm when a QR code is within field of view (HQR),
and for the hash matching algorithm over the global mission (HG).
given a priori by a mission controller or acquired by robots
while performing their missions. In addition, validating the
integrity of both mission instructions and sensor data without
any external feedback is an open problem. We have presented
a framework that enables robots to validate both the correct
operation of their onboard hardware and sensors, and the
integrity of information received from an external controller.
In particular, to the best of our knowledge, this paper
introduces and evaluates the first end-to-end validation frame-
work that focuses on navigation and localization with encoded
landmarks, which allows robots to effectively perform their
missions while performing end-to-end validation of informa-
tion. We have shown that utilizing an encoded navigation
graph adds only a negligible computational overhead even
when high-accuracy positioning is required.
The end-to-end validation scheme demonstrated in this
work for navigation tasks can be naturally extended to cover
virtually all domains of robotic operation. In future work,
we will focus our research efforts towards experimentation
in more relevant environments, and in particular industrial
settings. We will aim at extending this approach to other
interaction forms between a robot and its environment, from
multi-robot collaborative assembly to human-robot interaction
and control.
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